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Unlike a book in your hand, a fi lm keeps on going whether you like it or not. For it has an existence of its own. A microcosm larger than life, its boundaries are boundless.
-James Broughton
1
The fi lm of tomorrow will be lettrist and composed of subtitles. If at its conception cinema was by virtue of its images an attack on reading, the day will come when the cinema will be a mere form of reading.
-Isidore Isou 2 M arcel Duchamp's Anémic cinéma (1926) is one of the most unusual fi lms ever made, even by the standards of the early European avant-garde. It partly comprises a series of fi lmed roto-reliefs, vertiginous rotating spirals moving at a variety of speeds. If this were Anémic cinéma's sole content, it would be a compelling abstract fi lm in the tradition of Walter Ruttmann's Lichtspiel Opus I (1921) , Hans Richter's Rhythmus 21 (1921) , and Viking Eggeling's Symphonie diagonale (1924) . However, the shots of the roto-reliefs are interspersed with shots of ostensibly nonsensical written text: spinning phrases replete with alliteration, puns, and sexually suggestive double entendres (Figure 1 ). Here is a sampling of Duchamp's Dadaist wordplay:
The child who nurses is a sucker of hot flesh and does not like the cauliflower of the hot glass-house.
If I give you a penny, will you give me a pair of scissors [i.e. a fuck]?
Incest or family passion, in blows too drawn out.
Have you ever put the marrow of the sword into the stove of the loved one?
3
The centrality of language in Anémic cinéma challenged the widespread assumption that imagery-whether abstract or representational-was to be film's sole currency. Duchamp's cinematic vision was far more inclusive. He clearly sided with surrealist poet Robert Desnos, who asserted, "Everything that can be projected on the screen belongs in the cinema, letters as well as faces."
4 Written text in a film was nothing new, of course. Text had frequently been used in cinematic introductions, credit sequences, and intertitles. Indeed, intertitles were so ubiquitous in the era of silent cinema that the handful of films that disavowed them-such as F. W. Murnau's The Last Laugh (1924) , Dimitri Kirsanoff 's Ménilmontant (1926) , and Dziga Vertov's Man with a Movie Camera (1929)-were the exceptions that proved the rule.
5 Still, Anémic cinéma's use of text departed dramatically from its predecessors. Unlike conventional cinematic text, Duchamp's language served no narrative (or even paratextual) purpose. Instead, the function of the words was primarily poetic (or, in the spirit of Dadaism, anti-poetic). Text no longer needed to be relegated to a subservient role. In the post-Duchampian world, the Figure 1 . Cryptic language appears on a revolving disk in Marcel Duchamp's Anémic cinéma (1926; Kino International, 2005) .
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written word could be just as central to a film as imagery. 6 The door had been opened for a new kind of cinema: the textual film. Rather than being composed of photographic or animated imagery, these works would foreground letters, words, numbers, punctuation marks, and other forms of handwritten or typographical text-challenging what Hollis Frampton has called the "logophobia" endemic to cinema and other visual arts.
7
The prominence of text in avant-garde film has received a fair amount of scholarly attention.
8 However, the implications of these intermedia experiments have not yet been adequately theorized. I want to argue that text-based cinema challenges widespread preconceptions of what a film can do (and be) while also highlighting cinema's unique ability to modulate duration. Nowhere are the theoretical implications of textual cinema made clearer than in Michael Snow's So Is This (1982) , a self-referential film in which individual words appear on-screen, one at a time, gradually forming a series of statements that are alternately philosophical, facetious, and false. I claim that textual films like So Is This help demonstrate the folly of ontologies of cinema that prescribe necessary conditions. I also argue for a more Wittgensteinian approach to conceptualizing film, one that recognizes the boundless elasticity of concepts like film and language. However, before analyzing So Is This, it will be useful to situate the work within the broader context of Snow's cinematic oeuvre.
One of the most undertheorized elements in Snow's aesthetic is his fascination with stasis. In some of his films, movement is minimal, as is the case in Dripping Water (codirected with his wife, Joyce Wieland, 1969) , in which the only movement portrayed is water dripping into a dish.
9 In other Snow films, the movement is extremely slow, giving the viewer an impression of stasis. (Snow's protracted films include his widely revered Wavelength [1967] , a forty-five-minute zoom from one end of a room to another, and See You Later / Au Revoir [1990] , in which an ordinary thirty-second farewell is expanded to eighteen minutes.) And Snow is not afraid to push his interest in stasis to its logical conclusion: in several of his films, there is no on-screen movement at all. One Second in Montreal (1969) Snow's fascination with cinematic stasis is particularly salient in So Is This. This "motion picture" is motionless and pictureless-it consists only of immobile typographical text.
11 In other words, what is preeminent in So Is This is not movement or imagery, but duration. In fact, Snow has claimed that "controlling durations" is the starting point of his cinematic practice, and that So Is This and One Second in Montreal represent his "purest uses of duration."
12 As the text itself indicates, "the / decision / has / been / made / to / concentrate / on / the / distinctive / capacity / of / film / to / structure / time."
13 While Snow is correct to assert that film has a unique ability "to / structure / time," film's status as "a time form" (to borrow Maya Deren's memorable phrase) has been challenged by some theorists.
14 Thus, before making an argument about the temporality of textual films (and of cinema writ large), it will be necessary to address these criticisms.
The most prominent argument against film's status as a temporal art form runs like this: Everything takes place in time. Therefore, film is temporal only in the trivial sense that everything is temporal. After all, even paintings and sculptures must be looked at for a certain duration (even if it is a very brief one) to be apprehended. One of the most prominent proponents of this view is Anthony McCall (most famous for his seminal 1973 work of expanded cinema Line Describing a Cone). In McCall's view, "Everything that occurs, including the process of looking and thinking, occurs in time and . . . therefore, the distinction [between temporal and atemporal art] is absurd."
15 McCall further argues that "a piece of paper on the wall is as much a duration as the projection of a film. Its only difference is in its immediate relationship to our perception."
16
This is a seductive claim, one that is worthy of careful attention. McCall is certainly correct to point out that everything that happens, happens in time. He is also correct to suggest that a piece of paper on a wall may be more like a film than common sense would suggest, insofar as they are both likely to offer visual changes over a period of time-even if the piece of paper undergoes change at a rate that is beyond the realm [1972] [1973] , in which paper covered in cheap paint is presented as a quasi-cinema screen, so that the viewer can imagine the white paint slowly turning yellow over the course of several decades.) 17 In spite of these insights, I think McCall is ultimately mistaken to claim that paper on a wall is "as much a duration as the projection of a film." They may both endure for a period of time (as all things do), but there is a crucial difference: films offer a predetermined and structured duration, whereas paper does not. A filmmaker can modulate duration, deciding how long a spectator will see a given object or event, but this is not an option for an experimental artist who places pieces of paper on a wall. Obviously, there is no guarantee that a spectator will watch a film in its entirety, from beginning to end. Still, regardless of what a viewer may choose to do, a film has a fixed temporal structure, a predetermined durational unfolding that distinguishes it from traditional visual art.
Of course, So Is This is a remediation of written text, not visual art, and reading a book is temporally distinct from viewing a film, because the reader has more control over the rate of a work's durational unfolding.
18 Nevertheless, text remains temporal in a way that traditional visual art is not. Unlike a painting or a sculpture, text (along with film, drama, music, and so on) generally has an inherent trajectory that must be followed for a work to be apprehended. Unlike, say, One Second in Montreal, which temporalizes photography, or Side Seat Paintings Slides Sound Film, which temporalizes painting, So Is This uses the temporal medium of film to remediate another temporal medium: the book.
19 This raises the obvious question: why? This is a query Snow anticipates: "One / question / which / the / author / expects / is: / 'Why / would / anyone / want / to / do / such / a / thing / as / this?' / followed / by / 'wouldn't / a / book / be / better?'" This question implicitly hints at its own answer: by cinematizing written text itself (rather than the content of a particular text), Snow impels us to consider the distinctions between the two media. And the viewer gradually comes to the realization that the most salient distinction between the textual film and the written word resides in their varying temporal structures. As Mary Ann Doane notes, "So Is This asserts its difference from a book through its rigorous control of the time of reading. The slowness or the rapidity of the appearance of new words on the screen is a play with filmic temporality and audience anticipation." Indeed, if one sees the film version of So Is This in addition to reading the script, it is striking just how different the experiences are (even though they both involve reading the same text). 21 For example, readers of the script can set their own pace: they may choose to skim certain passages while reading others more carefully and deliberately. But this is not an option in So Is This. As Snow points out, "The number of frames per word and spaces between was precisely indicated. It's composed."
22 Because of this careful structuring of cinematic temporality, a reader is forced to accept Snow's pacing. At times, this means spending an inordinately long time staring at a single word. For example, at one point in the film, the text reads, "one / of / the / interests / of / this / system / is / that / each / word / can / be / held / on / the / screen / for / a / specific / length / of / time." While most of the words in the film remain on the screen for just a second or two, the word length in this passage remains in place for almost an entire minute (Figure 2 ). The eye becomes so tired of viewing the word that it begins to lose its semantic content and simply become an abstract series of shapes and squiggles. By the time the sentence finally completes itself, only alert viewers will remember how it began. In contrast, certain words appear on only a single frame of the filmstrip, and as a result, inattentive spectators may miss them entirely. This is most evident in the film's assault on the Ontario Board of Censors, which had previously banned Snow's four-and-a-half-hour "Rameau's Nephew" by Diderot (Thanx to Dennis Young) by Wilma Schoen (1974) for its graphic sexual imagery:
This / is / the / start / of / a / new / paragraph / from / which / any / children / present / should / shield / their / eyes. / Since / this / film / was / tits / originally / composed / ass / The / Ontario / Board / of / Censors / has / started / to / inspect / so-called / Experimental / Films. / e.g. / This. / Its [sic] / difficult / to / cock / understand / why / but / it / seems / as / if / their / purpose / is / to / protect / you / from / this. / To / protect / you / from / people / like / cunt / the / author / discussing / their / sexual / lives / or / fantasies / on / this / screen.
23
The taboo words here appear on the screen for only a split second, making it easy to miss them altogether. Unlike the word length, which feels weighty and laborious as a result of being on the screen for such an extended period of time, words like cock and cunt, because of their brief duration, seem sharp, caustic, and affectively jarring-even more so than usual. Through his control of the film's temporal structure, then, Snow is able to modulate the preexisting connotations of words, slightly altering the "flavor" of each one. (The flavor metaphor, incidentally, is borrowed directly from Snow: "I 
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hope that the spectators can savor the many duration forms that happen in So Is This. There are spicy ones, salty ones, sweet ones, etc."
24
) When struggling to read Snow's taboo words, which appear for only a split second, one is immediately reminded of another temporal distinction between books and films. In addition to permitting readers to set their own pace, books allow readers to return to previous passages in order to "catch" words or ideas that they might have missed the first time-or perhaps to review passages that were particularly compelling or confusing. But the durational unfolding of a film does not permit this. It proceeds at its own pace, indifferent to the demands of the audience. (Of course, the modern media environment complicates such distinctions: films like So Is This are increasingly viewed online, which does permit one to scroll back and catch passages that were initially missed.) Snow's strict durational control is what makes a screening of So Is This such a compelling experience. Because sentences become subdivided into the individual words that make them up, each word takes on a renewed importance, including words that are normally skimmed over, such as articles, prepositions, and conjunctions. In fact, because each word is formatted to take up approximately the same amount of space on the screen, small words appear in large typeface, and are thus more visually dominant than the sesquipedalian words that Snow uses (e.g., semiological, psychoanalytical, incommunicado) . Additionally, the experience becomes more participatory than more conventional modes of reading. In part, this is because the deliberateness (and relative slowness) with which each word appears encourages the audience to play a guessing game, hypothesizing about which direction a sentence will move in and which words will appear next. Scott MacDonald describes this dimension of the film perceptively:
In So Is This, Snow controls time-as all filmmakers do-and we are at his mercy. We cannot know what a sentence means until it's over; as a result, Snow's one-word-at-a-time structure forces viewers to construct a meaning, then reconstruct it, as individual words are revealed. Indeed, since the meaning of words is determined by their contexts within sentences, we cannot even be sure how a particular word is to be understood until subsequent words have been revealed. 
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So Is This calls attention to still another key distinction between reading a text and viewing a textual film: reading a book is almost always a solitary activity, whereas watching a film tends to be communal. Again, this situation has changed a great deal in the past several years, and I must confess that I watch more films alone (via the Internet, on DVD, and the like) than I do in group settings. Still, one can experience a film with other people in a way that is simply not possible with a book. One can certainly read along with someone else, but the experience is not the same. I have read parts of a book with a friend reading over my shoulder, for example, but invariably, the experience is temporally asynchronous, if only slightly: one of us will laugh before the other has reached the humorous passage, for example. But given the fixed duration of film, responses become concomitant. As Snow puts it, "Usually the tempo of reading depends on the reader, so it seemed interesting to use film to control the duration of reading because control of duration is a capacity of film, not of a book."
26 And the fact that communality is a concern of Snow's is hinted at in several passages in So Is This: "Warning: / This / film / may / be / especially / unsatisfying / for / those / who / dislike / having / others / read / over / their / shoulders." And later on in the film: "When / was / the / last / time / you / and / your / neighbor / read / together? / This / is / Communal / reading! / it's / Group / Lit!"
27
As the expression "Group / Lit" implies, So Is This represents a remediation of literary text (broadly defined). One is immediately reminded of Marshall McLuhan's famous claim that the contents of one medium are "always another medium. The content of the press is literary statement, the content of the book is speech, and the content of the movie is the novel."
28 McLuhan seems to be making the (somewhat myopic) assertion that films remediate novels insofar as they offer extended narratives (ones that occasionally directly adapt novelistic content). This claim clearly has little relevance to avant-garde cinema, which often has closer ties to poetry-or even music or painting-than the novel. Still, what is interesting about textual films is the way they adapt "literary" content in radically new ways. Rather than attempting to translate written text into visual imagery, the films provide written text as visual imagery.
To better appreciate this distinction, consider traditional remediations of the Bible, Western culture's most influential text (or, more accurately, collection of texts). Biblical narratives have been one of the primary sources of cinematic content, from early films about the life of Jesus by Thomas Edison and Louis Lumière to Hollywood blockbusters like Cecil B. DeMille's Samson and Delilah (1949) and The Ten Commandments in their minds: "Let's / all / raise / our / mental / voices / mutely, / mutually / in / song / (please / don't / move / your / lips). / Ready? / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4: / 'Some / where / o / ver / the / rain / bow / skies / are / blue . . .'" 26 Remes, "Sculpting Time," 20.
27 A rather different form of cinematic "Communal / reading" arises when an audience watches a foreign film with subtitles. Since entire phrases or sentences are usually displayed (as opposed to the word-by-word approach favored by Snow), reading rates can vary slightly, resulting in two kinds of temporal asynchrony: (1) individual spectators may read at different speeds, leading some to apprehend textual content before others, and (2) spectators may experience a "delay," reading the textual translation of a piece of dialogue before or after it is spoken. (For example, when watching foreign films, I often find myself quickly reading the subtitles with enough time remaining to anticipate how the actor or actress will deliver the lines I have just read.) (1956 31 It is the very fact that So Is This has no explicit pictorial element that allows the text itself to become pictorialized. The letters and words of Snow's films are not merely the carriers of semantic information but also visual experiences in their own right, typographic formations with a host of aesthetic and affective valences.
In some films, the idea of words as an aesthetic (rather than semantic) cinematic element is taken to extreme levels, resulting in text that cannot even be read. One of the earliest examples of this is Joseph Cornell's By Night with Torch and Spear, a collage
29 Warhol Bible appears to be a kind of practical joke, although this should not diminish its status as a serious meditation on the distinction between text and cinema. Since most viewers would hear the title and expect some kind of Warholian interpretation of Biblical stories (using actors, sets, dialogue, and so on), the absurdly literal content of the film would subvert these expectations. In fact, the idea for Warhol Bible is strongly reminiscent of the Fluxus film 12! Big Names ! (1975) , in which spectators were lured into the theater by flyers that promised they would see "big names"-like Warhol and Snow-only to be disappointed when they realized that the event was simply a textual film that displayed the stars' names in typographical text, one at a time. Clearly, By Night with Torch and Spear and Word Movie offer textual experiences that are quite distinct from So Is This, since in Snow's film, every word can be read and comprehended, so long as the viewer pays close attention. Still, Snow seeks to excavate more from his words than simply their semantic content. As was mentioned before, words that appear for prolonged durations lose their meaning and begin to become abstract shapes. (One is reminded of Warhol's maxim: "The more you look at the same exact thing, the more the meaning goes away." 33 ) And since small words like of and is are in very large typeface, the pictorial qualities of each individual letter become foregrounded. This was one of Snow's goals: "The hope was that the changes in scale from word to word will help the spectator to see each word as an individual shape, a pictograph, a picture-but also as a shot. Reading, as we learn it, is not 'seeing,' not 'regarding,' so I wanted to introduce pictorial/design perception as well as 'reading.'" At the very least, such films should make us wary of any attempt to define cinema through recourse to necessary conditions (i.e., "x is a film if, and only if, it has the following properties"). Many film theorists have found themselves caught in the trap of drawing strict boundary lines around their object of study, only to have those boundaries challenged by some forward-thinking filmmaker or new technology. The result is a series of (more or less) pointless debates about whether x is a true film. Noël Carroll is one of the chief offenders here. In his essay "Defining the Moving Image," he argues that there are five necessary conditions that must be met for something to be accurately categorized as a film. In the interest of time, I give consideration to only 32 Another film that is worth mentioning here is Takahiko Iimura's White Calligraphy (1967) , in which characters from the Kojiki, an eighth-century Japanese text, are scratched directly into the film stock and displayed in rapid succession. As Iimura points out, it is not possible to read the film's text, even if one is fluent in Japanese: "Certain characters can be read, but not all of them; it's too fast. 38 This claim has not aged well. Given the ubiquity of films watched on televisions, computer screens, and iPods in today's postmedium convergence culture, few would continue to argue that light must be projected in order for a film to exist.
39 (And this is not to mention a film like Walter Ruttmann's Weekend [Wochenende; 1930] , which features no light at all, but merely an audio track of "found" sounds accompanied by a blank screen.) Of course, it would be anachronistic to expect McCall to foresee future technological developments. But this is precisely the problem with demarcating boundaries around what a film is or can be: since any conception of cinema is necessarily limited by the technological and aesthetic practices that happen to be current at any given time, one can often mistake the contingent for the necessary. Does anyone doubt that fifty years from now new technologies and innovative filmmakers will 
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have pushed the boundaries of cinema in new directions, ones that are simply unthinkable today? And this should be seen as a welcome development, not some bothersome challenge to ontological or theoretical dogmas. Concepts are not immutable, discrete entities created by a deity with strict predetermined functions; they evolve over time and continually adapt to varying intellectual and cultural environments. The concept film is no exception. There is simply no need to speculate about every future development in cinematic praxis before offering a tentative conception of film, so long as one does not paint oneself into a corner by insisting on inflexible boundaries. But what is the alternative? How can we speak coherently about film without precisely defining our object of study? Ludwig Wittgenstein's famous discussion of games should provide solace to anyone who is troubled by such questions. In one of the most memorable passages of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein points out that while we have little trouble using and understanding a term like game, this does not imply that there are any necessary conditions for something to be classified as such:
Consider, for example, the activities that we call "games." I mean boardgames, card-games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on. What is common to them all?-Don't say: "They must have something in common, or they would not be called 'games'"-but look and see whether there is anything common to all.-For if you look at them, you won't see something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities, and a whole series of them at that. . . . I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family-build, features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth-overlap and criss-cross in the same way.-And I shall say: "games" form a family.
40
This is precisely the approach one should take in understanding what films are. Films can be incredibly diverse: black-and-white or color, silent or sound, moving or static, photographic or textual, two-dimensional or three-dimensional, and so on. But as diverse as films can be, they nevertheless have clear family resemblances that conceptually link them. And we come to understand these resemblances inductively, not deductively. As Wittgenstein puts it, "How would we explain to someone what a game is? I think that we'd describe games to him, and we might add to the description: 'This and similar things are called 'games. '" 41 And is this not also how we might explain to someone what a film is? There is no need to draw rigid (and arbitrary) boundaries; film, in Wittgensteinian parlance, is "a concept with blurred edges." Rodowick also astutely asserts that "cinema studies can stake no permanent claims on its disciplinary territories; its borders are in fact continually shifting."
43 He elaborates: "Every medium consists of a variable combination of elements. In this respect, moving image media are related more by a logic of Wittgensteinian family resemblances than by clear and essential differences."
44 However, Rodowick does not seem to be fully convinced by his own argument. Consider, for instance, his comments on Stan Brakhage's film Mothlight (1963) . To create this innovative work, Brakhage collected the wings of dead moths, blades of grass, dirt, and other miscellany, and taped them directly to the filmstrip. The result is a kind of cinematic alchemy-the ordinary objects become utterly transformed by their magnification, luminosity, and spatiotemporal arrangement, and the film's frenetic succession of images creates an experience of rare aesthetic force. Mothlight would seem to be a prime example of a filmmaker "shifting" the borders of cinema, a bold reimagining of what a film can do or be. Yet Rodowick challenges Mothlight's status as a film, claiming that "films of unrecognizable or nearly unrecognizable images such as Peter Gidal's Room Film (1973) remain films, while Stan Brakhage's Mothlight (1963) is rather a motion sculpture animated by the projection apparatus."
45 This is a puzzling distinction. Brakhage's original creation could certainly be conceptualized as a kind of sculpture, but why would running this work through a projector fail to produce a film? (Recall that Hollis Frampton once provisionally defined film as "whatever will pass through a projector." 46 ) To be sure, Mothlight is radically different from a more traditional film, like, say, Casablanca (Michael Curtiz, 1942) , but is there not a clear family resemblance here? As a careful reader of Wittgenstein might point out, solitaire and basketball offer very different experiences, but they both remain games.
Wittgenstein has been an important influence on textual films in general and Snow's cinema in particular.
47 Like Wittgenstein, Snow dismantles facile conceptual taxonomies that resort to necessary conditions. By creating films without movement, films without imagery, films without filmstrips, and so on, Snow consistently challenges our preconceived notions of cinema. Consider the aforementioned A Casing Shelved, which presents a single stationary slide of a bookcase accompanied by Snow's recorded voice describing it. Noël Carroll has questioned the cinematic credentials of A Casing Shelved: "I would argue that this 'film' is not a film at all; to be a film, properly so called, requires the literal possibility of movement." 48 Snow's response to Carroll is impeccably Wittgensteinian. Rather than pedantically obsessing about necessary conditions, Snow has simply said, "A Casing Shelved is categorically problematic. However, it is a projection on a screen from a 35mm transparent source. There is no movement on the screen, but the movements of the eyes of the spectator are directed by the sound-my voice. That there is sound, which is a movement in time, is important in considering the work's cinema status."
49 In addition to drawing our attention to the family resemblances between A Casing Shelved and more traditional fare, Snow usefully reminds us of the deeply entrenched bias toward the visual that subtends most theories of cinema. It seems absurd to claim that a work with visual movement but no possibility of sound (e.g., Stan Brakhage's The Riddle of Lumen [1972] ) is not a film. Yet somehow it seems more defensible to claim that a work with sound but no possibility of visual movement (like A Casing Shelved) is not a film. Ultimately, either claim rests on an unwarranted assumption that we must draw strict boundaries around the concept of film. It is hard to improve on Wittgenstein's formulation in The Blue Book (one of his studies for Philosophical Investigations): "If . . . you wish to give a definition of wishing, i.e., to draw a sharp boundary, then you are free to draw it as you like; and this boundary will never entirely coincide with the actual usage, as this usage has no sharp boundary."
50 The same is true of film. Theorists are free to draw prescriptive boundaries, and filmmakers are free to ignore them-in much the same way that traditional grammarians are free to insist that splitting an infinitive results in an ungrammatical sentence, whereas everyday speakers of English are free to completely disregard this rule. The concept of a film (like the concept of a grammatical sentence) is continually evolving. The word has no fixed definition, nor should we wish to place it in such a conceptual straitjacket. As Wittgenstein puts it, " [W] e are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use; not because we don't know their real definition, but because there is no real 'definition' to them. To suppose that there must be would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play a game according to strict rules."
51
In addition to stretching our predetermined notions of what a film can do, So Is This is equally intent on stretching our notions of what language can do. On both accounts, Snow challenges the facile generalizations that we easily fall prey to (e.g., films tell stories, language communicates information). Wittgenstein's account of the malleability and infinite diversity of language in Philosophical Investigations is especially apposite here: "Think of the tools in a toolbox: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a But how many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion, question, and command?-There are countless kinds; countless different kinds of use of all the things we call "signs," "words," "sentences." And this diversity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new languagegames, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.
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So Is This introduces us to a host of new language games. While the standard uses of sentences all make an appearance-assertion ("This / is / communal / reading!"), question ("Is / there / anybody / reading / this / right / now?"), and command ("Just / think / of / this / as / entertainment.")-there are also playful uses of words that represent apparently novel language games. Consider an unusual passage near the end of the film, in which Snow announces that he will provide "ten / solo / words" (before going on to provide twenty-five): "And / Now; / ten / solo / words: / Coffee / Whisper / Psychoanalytical / Sunlight / Sodomy / Chalk / Blast / Mind / Duke / Mohammedan / Braille / Blink / Simulacrum / Hiss / Mask / Annihilation / Lips / Truth / Cuneiform / Choir / Flesh / Liturgy / Cave / Flower / Incommunicado."
54
Putting these words in sequence appears to produce nonsense, an ungrammatical word salad that offers no meaning. Of course, in the words of evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould, "humans are pattern-seeking animals," 55 so it is difficult to read this sequence of words without searching for some kind of organizing principle (e.g., Is the "Cave" Plato's cave, where there is no "Sunlight," and "Simulacra" replace "Truth"?). But such a hermeneutic framework risks playing one language game by the rules of another. What is important here is not meaning, but flavor: not only the "spicy," "salty," or "sweet" connotations of each word individually, but also (in the spirit of Eisensteinian montage) the novel connotations that arise as a result of Snow's unusual juxtapositions. As Wittgenstein has noted, nonsensical language can still have a measured and deliberate effect on hearers (or readers), depending on what kind of language game is being played: "When I say that the orders 'Bring me sugar!' and 'Bring me milk!' have a sense, but not the combination 'Milk me sugar,' this does not mean that the utterance of this combination of words has no effect."
56 Similarly, Snow's unusual combinations of words may be senseless, but there is clearly still effect on the audience. Of particular interest is how many of the words in this passage relate to various forms or methods of communication-"Whisper," "Chalk," "Braille," "Hiss," "Lips," "Cuneiform"-even though the passage itself communicates nothing (and ends with a word that evokes a lack of communication: incommunicado). Both in 52 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 10. 53 Ibid., 15 (italics in original) .
54 This is not the only occasion on which the text proves to be untrustworthy. Early in the film, we read, "this / film / will / be / about / two / hours / long," even though the actual running length of So Is This is less than fifty minutes. Currents (1982) . Like So Is This, Secondary Currents visually offers nothing more than typographical text, although in this case, the text is accompanied by a soundtrack, one in which a voice is heard speaking a nonexistent language. The on-screen text undergoes a kind of linguistic entropy. The film's words are initially fairly straightforward ("I don't remember when the voice began"), but lucid language eventually gives way to incomprehensible jargon ("whose meandering lucubrations / foretold the essential entropy / of euphostolic processes and peregrinations / re-invitriafied by the subcholate stratifications / of an ecstatic generative demuneration"). Eventually, we are left with apparently aleatory combinations of words and punctuation marks: "frisson eldo bas erra ti gon / ship to antel k trio lo montre / pi l like s k soke sl abqu ek / dko tj s abi. tu n kto / rt l px ex: s at l / t-thel /: kethe ls o / ke lnc i ! u a je t s le / ee tri-sit pn vo tep." By the end of the film, the screen is littered with random letters and punctuation marks (Figure 3) . rather a collection of different games with different rules (or perhaps no rules at all). As Wittgenstein points out, "Even a nonsense poem is not nonsense in the same way as the babble of a baby."
58
Although I am unable to catalog all the language games that Snow plays throughout So Is This (there are far too many), it will be instructive to give attention to one additional example. Contra Wittgenstein's claim that "the demonstrative 'this' can never be without a bearer," Snow refuses to identify the this of the film's title-or at least, if there is an identity, it seems to continually shift.
59 Consider some of the sentences that appear early in the film: "This / is / the / title / of / this / film." "The / rest / of / this / film / will / look / just / like / this." "This, / as / they / say, / is / the / signifier." There is an inescapable and unresolved ambiguity in these sentences. For example, when the film asserts that "this . . . is / the / signifier," we are left wondering: what is the signifier, exactly? The word this? The language Snow is using? The medium of film itself ? Or perhaps all of the above? Snow exploits the same linguistic loophole that was foregrounded by René Magritte when he painted his landmark La trahison des images (The Treachery of Images, 1928 Images, -1929 , in which a straightforward painting of a pipe is accompanied by text that reads, "Ceci n'est pas une pipe" ("This is not a pipe"). The confusion that the painting frequently engenders (if this is not a pipe, then what is it?) comes from the ambiguity of the word this (ceci)-a viewer might initially interpret this as the representational content of the painting (which clearly is a pipe), but this can also mean the painting itself (which, of course, is most emphatically not a pipe). 60 In the post-Wittgensteinian universe that Snow inhabits, neither words nor films have single fixed meanings, functions, or essences-rather, concepts are fluid and in a state of continual flux. Snow puts it this way: "Language lives-grows, bulges, shrinks, learns to talk, loses its hair. . . . There is a sense in which the cloudiness at the edges of the compendium of definitions of Art, which is especially noticeable, is also discernible on examination of all definitions." 61 Noël Carroll's non-Wittgensteinian definition of film, which insists on the centrality of potential movement, would seem to exclude a textual film like So Is This. Revealingly, Carroll does categorize So Is This as a film, although his reasons for doing so are peculiar:
We categorize So Is This as a film because we know the tradition in which Snow is working. It fits into an ongoing conversation about the nature of cinema. If Milton's Paradise Lost were recorded on film-a page being turned every thousand frames or so-and, if that was the only form in which it ex- isted, we would not call it a film, but a poem. The same would be true if Ezra Pound initially "published" his Cantos on film. Our classifications depend far more on history and what we know of the author's intentions than upon that through which medium the work is delivered.
62
This contention seems to rest on a false dichotomy: that a textual film must be either a film or a poem. Why could it not be simultaneously both? In fact, some scholars have written about cine-poetry or the poetry-film as a way of conceptualizing works that that straddle the boundary between these two art forms. 63 The idea that somethingliterary or otherwise-might be "recorded on film" but not called a film is perplexing.
Presumably, Carroll is implying the following: if Ezra Pound had released Cantos on film, it would be called a poem, but if he instead decided to publish Cantos as a book, and Andy Warhol later created Warhol Cantos, this would fit "into an ongoing conversation about the nature of cinema" and would now be a film. If this seems like a defensible distinction, imagine the following scenario: I tell my wife that I am going upstairs to see what our son is doing. When I open the door to his bedroom, I find that his DVD player is running, and I see my son eating popcorn while gazing intently at his television screen. On the screen I see only the pages of an opened book with typographical text on it. I return downstairs, and my wife asks me, "What is he doing?" Acceptable answers to this question include "watching TV," "watching a film," or even "watching some really weird film that just shows the pages of a book." But imagine if I responded to my wife's query by saying, "I honestly do not know. I will need to do some research to learn more about the historical circumstances and authorial intent of the object of our son's inquiry before I am in any position to determine what kind of artwork he is engaging with." She would be absolutely justified in worrying about my mental health.
Textual films and other intermedia hybrids continue to proliferate in the modern era. (One particularly compelling example is the work of Young-Hae Chang Heavy Industries, a Seoul-based Internet art group that temporalizes text using Flash animation technology in works like Cunnilingus in North Korea [2003] and Lotus Blossom [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] .) Such works foreground the mutability of concepts like art, literature, and film while implicitly subverting essentialist ideologies. In fact, interrogating artworks that challenge conventional media boundaries is perhaps the preeminent method of coming to understand a given medium. As David Campany puts it, "We come to know what media are less by looking for their pure centers than their disputed boundaries."
64 Film has no "pure center," no essence, no rigid boundaries demarcating its territorial domain. But film is in good company here. As Wittgenstein
